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RECENT DECISIONS
Conclusion

It seems that the court in Rice has inadvertently eliminated the
rule that restricts the scope of cross-examination and by implication
has adopted Rule 105 of the Model Code of Evidence.2 3 This rule makes
the scope of cross-examination a matter of the trial court's discretion.
Adoption of Rule 105 should allow an orderly trial without placing
a restriction on the extent of the witness' admissible testimony on
either direct or cross-examination. The rule also preserves our partisan
witness form of advocacy. Such preservation is necessary because the
adoption of the wide-open type of cross-examination would in effect
eliminate the normal rules of evidence as to the foundation for competency, the partisan witness rule and the order of trial. The state's
24
witness becomes a witness for both the prosecution and the defense.
LESLIE J. MLAKAR

Torts-Negligence-Recovery for Emotional Trauma: In
Dillon v. Legg,' a mother brought a negligence action against the driver
of an automobile that struck and killed her infant daughter. She alleged
that because she had witnessed the accident, and because she had feared
for the safety of her child, she sustained great emotional disturbance,
shock, and injury to her nervous system. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The issue presented on appeal
to the state supreme court was whether tort liability may be predicated
on emotional trauma and attendant bodily illness that have been induced
by apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury to a closely
related person. In a 4 to 3 decision, the supreme court recognized the
mother's cause of action.
With one exception,' the courts since 1930 have denied recovery un23 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 105 (1942) :
The judge controls the conduct of the trial to the end -that the evidence
shall be presented honestly, expeditiously and in such form as to be readily
understood, and in his discretion, among other things . . .

(h) to what extent and in what circumstances a party cross-examining
a witness may be forbidden to examine him concerning material matters
not inquired about on a previous examination by the judge or by the
adverse party ....
24
Neider v. Spoehr, 41 Wis. 2d 610, 165 N.W.2d 171 (1969), a civil case
handed down after the Rice decision, the supreme court ruled that the scope
of cross-examination was a matter of the trial court's discretion. In Boller v.
Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N.W.2d 129 (1969), another civil case, the
court expressly adopted Rule 105(h) of the Model Code of Evidence. The
court indicated that the rule should be applied in both civil and criminal
trials.
168
Cal. 2d 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)
2
1n Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937), aff'd on rehearing, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938), the plaintiff was sold poisoned
feed for his dairy cows. He suffered a mental breakdown and eventual death
induced by his fear for the safety of those to whom he had sold milk. The
high degree of care imposed on those who handle poison, as well as a product
liability aspect, diminishes the applicability of the case to automobile fact
situations.
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der similar circumstances. Indeed, a caveat to Section 313 in the First
Restatement of Torts (1934) seemed to favor recovery for a parent or
a spouse, 4 but in 1960 the ALI bowed to the overwhelming case law and
removed the caveat, substituting a definite rule of nonliability. 5 But the
determination of the possible effect Dillon will have on tort law, and
the cogency of its reasoning, require that its reasoning be compared
with the cases holding to the contrary.
Writing for the majority, Justice Tobriner postulated that the refusal to impose liability in the cases before Dillon was attributable to
late nineteenth-century concepts of duty. But, " '[D] uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff
is entitled to protection. ' 6 Thus refusal to recognize a duty in particular
instances was based on a fear that courts would be flooded with fraudulent and indefinable claims.
3Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Beaty v. Buckeye
Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ; Jennings v. United
States, 178 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1959), vacated on other grounds, 291 F.2d
880 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ;
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) ; Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957) ;
Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. 2d 356, 63 P.2d 914 (1937) ; McCullough v. Orcutt,
14 Ill. App. 2d 503, 145 N.E.2d 109 (1957); Warr v. Kemp, 208 So. 2d 570
(La. App. 1968) ; Duet v. Cheramie, 176 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1965) ; LaPlace
v. Minks, 174 So. 2d 895 (La App. 1965); Johnston v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank,
152 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1963); Vinet v. Checker Cab Co., 140 So. 2d 252
(La. App. 1962); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1959);
Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 Ad2d 788 (1963) ; Cote v. Litawa, 96
N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950) ; Tobin v. Grossman, 55 Misc. 2d 304, 284
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Robbins v. Castellani, 37 Misc. 2d 1046, 239
N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); Kalina v. General Hosp., 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Smith v. Incorporated Village of Plandome, 28 Misc. 2d 793, 213
N.Y.S.2d 119 (1961) ; All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn. App. 134, 252 S.W.2d
138 (1952); McMahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N.W.2d 63 (1960);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
Two cases decided in 1968 also denied liability. Jelly v. Laflame, 108 N.H.
471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968), was decided four months before the decision in
Dillon. Tobin v. Grossman, 30 App. Div. 2d 229, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1968),
was decided seven days after Dillon. Jelly followed the basic reasoning
of prior decisions such as Barber v. Pollock, Cote v. Litawa, Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., and Waube v. Warrington, supra. The court
in Tobin refused to discuss the reasoning underlying its decision and referred
the reader to the majority opinion in Amnaya.
4 "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether an actor whose conduct
is negligent as involving an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to a
child or spouse is liable for an illness or other bodily harm caused to the
parent or spouse who witnesses the peril or harm of the child or spouse and
thereby suffers anxiety or shock which is the legal cause of the parent's or
spouse's illness or other bodily harm." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 313 at 851
(1934).
5 "Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a child in the street,
and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers
severe emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm to
her, she cannot recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself in the
path of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with bodily
harm to herself otherwise than through the emotional distress at the peril to
her child." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 313, comment d at 114 (1965).
6441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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The Dillon court clearly recognizes the possibility of fraud in many
attempts to recover for bodily injury sustained as a result of the apprehension of danger or injury to another, though it found no such problem in the case before it. Relief was granted to the plaintiff-mother regardless of any possible future administrative problems. "'Courts must
depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular cases.' ,,7"Yet we cannot let
the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a rem'8
edy for every substantial wrong."
But in handling the second ground for refusal to recognize a duty
in given cases, indefinable claims (i.e., an inability to place limitations
on liability), the majority looked to foreseeability, declaring it, at one
point, to be the chief element in determining whether the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff 9 and, at another point, actually equating it
with duty. 10 Once the subtle transition from foreseeability to duty was
made, the necessity of setting out policy guidelines was avoided and the
court could then proceed at once to establish the determinants of foreseeability."1 Quoting from Prosser that, "When a child is endangered,
it is not beyond the contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in
the vicinity and will suffer serious shock," the majority contended that
traditional limitations on liability--i.e., necessity of presence within the
zone of danger and fear for one's own safety-were arbitrary. Because
it is logical that a mother will be in the proximity of her infant child
and may suffer physical harm should she witness the child's injury or
death, such events should be reasonably foreseeable by the ordinary
man. If this is so, it may be questioned why courts have found it necessary to use somewhat arbitrary standards, resulting from their fear of
fraudulent and indefinable claims, in determining liability.
Certainly the Dillon court's dismissal of fraudulent and indefinable
claims as impediments to relief was persuasive, but the force of its
logic is somewhat diminished when contrasted with the reasoning in
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,' 3 a case explicitly overruled
by Dillon. While the majority in Dillon stated that, "the interests of
meritorious plaintiffs should prevail over alleged administrative diffiat 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
8 Id.at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
Id.at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
7Id.

9

10 Id.
11 "(1)

Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of
the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and
the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship." Id.
12 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (3d ed. 1964).

13

59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
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culties,"' 4 Amaya had held that "[J]ustice exists only when it is effectively administered,"' 5 and once this was realized, "[W]e may be more
comfortable in admitting that it is impossible to provide a remedy for
every wrong. 116 If this shows the Dillon-Amaya contrast as to fraudulent claims, with indefinable ones the Dillon court made foreseeability
the limiting factor, as noted above, thereby avoiding the broad policy
considerations that it called "fixed categories," or "immutable rules."
Under this approach, an inevitable question arises whether these policy
considerations will be considered, anyway-at least subjectively-by
judges deciding future cases under the foreseeability test. Thus whether
foreseeability is equated with duty or is considered as an element of
duty, it is perhaps necessary for any modem court to examine such
policy considerations as a concomitant to affording recovery.
In Amaya, foreseeability is but one of several relevant factors in
the determination of duty. "The degree of certainty between the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm,"' 7 are all
important in such determination. The narrow approach taken by the
Dillon court in failing to discuss any policy considerations other than
the two-part administrative problem is evident in its treatment of the
classic Wisconsin case denying recovery in this area, Waube v. War8
rington.1
Placing what is perhaps undue emphasis on the fraudulent
claim aspect of Waube, the court in Dillon failed to note the other
policy considerations discussed by the Wisconsin court, for Waube
clearly indicated that fear of fraudulent claims was only one of numerous considerations in balancing the social interests involved.
[T]he liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, would put
unreasonable burdens upon the users of the highway, open the
way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no sensible
or just stopping point."' 9
Indeed, it does not seem likely that Waube would have been followed
as authority for thirty-three years in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions,
including California, solely because of its weight as precedent or on the
basis of its stand against fraudulent claims.
The Dillon court was also somewhat deceptive in tracing the development of California law in the area of recovery for emotional
trauma. It interpreted the California case of Lindley v. Knowlton20
as holding that, "a mother could recover for fear for her children's
14441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
15 379 P.2d at 520, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
16Id.
17 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
is216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
19 Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
20 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918).
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safety if she simultaneously entertained a personal fear for herself." 21
This is clearly not the holding. As correctly pointed out by the Dillon
dissent, Lindley "[H]eld only that liability may be predicated upon
fright and consequent illness induced by the plaintiff's reasonable fear
for her own safety, even when the plaintiff may also have feared for
the safety of her children."22 The majority in Dillon also apparently
misinterpreted the case of Reed v. Moore,23 which did not hold that
"[T]he mother need only be in the 'zone of danger' to recover for
emotional trauma .. . ,24 but, rather, "[A] wife who was outside of
a collision in which her husband was
the zone of danger but witnessed
5
injured could not recover."'
In fashioning its decision, the majority in Dillon avoids the discussion of certain basic policy considerations. One such consideration
concerns the culpability of the tortfeasor. While stating that the defendant's liability and fault must be adjudicated, Dillon never effectively confronts the conclusion found in Waube, and quoted in Alnya,
that "The liability doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability
26
of the negligent tortfeasor."'
A second area neglected by the decision is its economic impact upon
society. The danger exists that courts, confronted with difficult cases,
will open wide avenues of recovery before the ability of society to pay
is critically evaluated. As society increases in size and complexity, it
is arguable that the number of accidents will also increase. While the
question whether such increased activity should be burdened with the
extended liability Dillon imposes can be given the possible answer of
expanded insurance coverage, such a solution raises two further questions: what are the limits of policy coverage required to meet this
expanded coverage and can society afford to pay the premiums that will
be involved?
A third area that the court in Dillon fails to discuss is the prophylactic effect of the decision. Exactly how will Mrs. Dillon's recovery
decrease the number of such accidents in the future? If the case really
has no tangible preventative value, perhaps a more skeptical appraisal
of Dillon's expanded liability is necessary.
In conclusion, it is very possible that justice now demands that a
mother's right to be free from emotional disturbance and bodily injury, resulting from fear for her child's safety, needs protection. But
to support her recovery in the light of extremely strong precedent to
the contrary requires that any theory granting such recovey be butP.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (dissenting opinion).
23 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957).
24 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
25 Id. at 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (dissenting opinion).
26 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. RptrL at 45.
21441

22 Id. at
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tressed by an opinion containing thorough and convincing reasoning. 7
Manipulation of "traditional words" is no replacement for critical analysis. The Dillon majority's avoidance of cogent policy considerations is
a principal weakness and the decision may very likely be of little aid
to future plaintiffs in similar factual circumstances.
ROBERT C. ROTH
Constitutional Law: Fair Labor Standards Act: Maryland v.
Wirtz-In Maryland v. Wirtz,' the State of Maryland was joined by
twenty-seven other states and one school district in bringing an action
to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the 1961 and 1966
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.2 The Act was
passed to impose, inter alia, minimum wage and maximum hour working conditions for employees engaged in interstate commerce. The Congress, under the power of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3
extended coverage of the Act to all employees "engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce."' 4 At the time the 1938
Act was passed Congress excluded from the definition of interstate
commerce employer, "the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State." In 1966 the Act was amended and coverage was
extended to all employees of any "enterprise" engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce.6 This new feature of the
Act became known as the "enterprise concept." In Wirtz v. First State
Abstract & Insurance Co.,7 the Supreme Court classified employees as
being subject to the "enterprise concept" if their activities were "directly and vitally related to interstate commerce." 8 In Wirtz v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,9 enterprise was defined as:
[T]he related activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether
performed in one or more establishments or by one or more
27 The majority in Dillon declared that contributory negligence of the injured
daughter would have defeated the mother's claim. Was the majority declaring
that contributory negligence can be imputed from a child to its mother? If
so, this is a revolutionary change in tort law-especially so, since the court
little discussed its merits. Alternatively, was the majority stating that the
mother's injury was a part of the child's cause of action? The opinion provides little in the way of a correct interpretation.
1392 U.S. 183 (1968).
2 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1964).
- U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964).
5 Id. § 203 (d).
6 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II,
1966).
7362 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1966).
8 Id.at 87.
9237 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. S.C. 1965), rev'd 356 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966).

